

Tasks of North Korea Policy of the Yoon Suk-yeol Government: Déjà vu or a New Paradigm

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The Yoon Suk-yeol administration was born as the eighth government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) since the country's democratization in 1987. The ROK government's North Korea policy has swung between two sides of the ideological spectrum with the change in government. Although changes have swept across international circumstances and situations on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea policy has remained locked in the repetition of existing discourse. Now is the time for North Korea policy to seek a new paradigm by leaving behind this déjà vu amidst changing external and internal circumstances.

Challenges facing the ROK take complex forms, with newly emerging challenges combining with old, structural, and circumstantial ones. North Korea's nuclear threats and arms race, albeit outdated challenges, appear renewed and increasingly threatening. South-South conflicts, although outdated as well, are morphing into something much more complicated. The new Cold War and global ecological crisis are new and structural challenges. Inter-Korean economic cooperation, hindered by sanctions, should explore a new path.

A new paradigm in North Korea policy should implement a sustainable policy adaptable to the changing environment and seek a resolution to the current challenges from a convergent engagement policy that strategically combines engagement and pressure. In addition, three-dimensional arms control, humanitarian cooperation, and a green détente should be set and promoted as the new agenda. A new paradigm of North Korea policy should embrace both the progressive and conservative camps and be undergirded by cooperative governance and consensus that connects the government, political parties, and civil society.

Keywords: sustainable North Korea policy, convergent North Korea policy, humanitarian cooperation and Green Detente, public debate, and governance

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I . Introduction

The Republic of Korea (ROK) government's North Korea policy, since the democratization in 1987, has continuously moved from one end of the ideological spectrum to the other depending on the shift of the government from the progressive to the conservative. As a consequence, North Korea policy has lost consistency and public opinion fiercely polarized. A lack of sustainability in North Korea policy has harbored mistrust for ROK's North Korea policy among North Korea and the international community alike. Whenever a new government was sworn in, it tried to differentiate North Korea policy from the previous one and sought to expand the public support but to no avail: neither progressive nor conservative governments were able to expand their support base. Instead of discussing the feasibility and goals of North Korea policy, each side only focused on highlighting its own argument while denigrating the other side's argument. This one-sided call was never echoed back; interactions between both sides regarding unification issues were at a stalemate. While North Korea policy has swayed between the progressive and the conservative, the international and North Korea's politics went through tumultuous times. In retrospect, South Korea has engaged in futile debates in an echo-chamber without turning an attentive eye to changes in external and internal circumstances.

With the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, the helm of South Korea has been taken into the hands of the conservative camp from the progressive camp. Will the Yoon Suk-yeol administration break the repeated vicious cycle locked in the political, ideological spectrum? In the midst of shifting international circumstances, namely, the new Cold War, can it present a new paradigm to North Korea which declared to have become a *de facto* nuclear weapons state?

To answer those questions, the next chapter compares issues in North Korea policy debated during the previous ROK governments, examines internal and external challenges, and lays out a new paradigm for North Korea policy.

II. Comparison of North Korea Policy of the ROK Governments after Democratization

After democratization in 1987, North Korea policy has differed between progressive governments and conservative ones and been categorized as either engagement policy or pressure policy. An engagement policy paradigm largely encompasses the Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy of the Kim Dae-jung government, the Peace and Prosperity Policy of the Roh Moo-hyun government, and the Korean Peninsula Policy of the Moon Jae-in government. By contrast, the Lee Myung-bak administration's North Korea Policy under the Principle of Coexistence and Co-prosperity and the Park Geun-hye administration's Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula are categorized as pressure policy. Although it may be a slight oversimplification, the two paradigms can largely be defined based on the following criteria.

The first criteria is the goal of North Korea policy. Issues at stake here are whether a focus should be given to peacefully managing the divided state and pursuing a peaceful coexistence, or to achieving unification. In other words, it is a matter of pursuing a de facto unification on a sound footing of peaceful coexistence and cooperation or seeking legislative or institutional unification.

The progressive governments have set the desired goal as realizing a de facto unification by settling peace and institutionalizing exchanges and cooperation. In contrast, the conservative governments have set the goal as legislative and institutional unification and focused on mapping out a vision for unification and preparing for unification as opposed to managing the division or focusing on the unification process.

The second criteria is the perception of North Korea. Whether we acknowledge the North Korean regime as a legitimate political system and how we perceive North Korea is what determines North Korean policy. The progressive government usually recognizes North Korea as a political entity and seeks a dialogue for exchange and cooperation. On the other

hand, the conservative government generally sees North Korea with vigilance and animosity and seeks to change the North Korean regime.

The third criteria is the particularity and universality of unification and North Korean issues. This is about to what extent we accept the particularity of North Korea and how the international norms should be applied in inter-Korean relations. The 1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (hereinafter referred to as "the Basic Agreement") stipulates that inter-Korean relations are "not relations between nations, but special relations established temporarily in the course of pursuing unification." Separated family issues and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation are challenges facing the Korean ethnicity. However, the nuclear issue, the humanitarian issue for North Korean residents, and the guarantee of investment in North Korea all belong to the purview of international norms.

The progressive governments have paid more attention to the particularity intrinsic in ethnic issues, rather than universal principles. North Korea's particularity, instead of universal principles, has always been factored in when it comes to humanitarian issues and exchange and cooperation, which are viewed as ethnic issues.

However, the conservative governments have stressed universal principles for inter-Korean relations. They argue that North Korea is no exception to and should abide by internationally-held universal norms and principles. They also believe that North Korea should implement economic reform and openness in conformity with international standards and start working on humanitarian issues and that inter-Korean exchange and cooperation should follow the universal logic of the international community.

The fourth criteria is the priority afforded to the nuclear issue. Ever since North Korea's nuclear issue emerged in the early 1990s, it became a variable that determines how inter-Korean relations would unfold. Main issues thus include how the nuclear issue is set in light of inter-Korean relations and how it is linked to military, economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian issues.

The progressive governments typically recognize the priority given to the nuclear issue but at the same time try to separate it from inter-Korean cooperation as much as possible or handle the two problems simultaneously. They try to find a common ground in which inter-Korean cooperation is possible even though resolving the nuclear issue is not in sight anytime soon. In other words, this is an attempt to separate politics from economics, or more specifically, separating political and military issues from exchange and cooperation issues.

On the other hand, the conservative governments usually criticize that not only did the separation of politics and the economy fail to induce a change from North Korea but also allowed North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. Conservative governments assert that inter-Korean relations, in particular economic cooperation, should be conditional on whether North Korea would participate in solving nuclear issues. They claim that realistically, improving inter-Korean relations can neither make progress, nor is desirable without the nuclear issue making strides.

The fifth criteria is reciprocity, which consists of diffuse reciprocity and specific reciprocity.¹ Diffuse reciprocity is a flexible form of reciprocity principle and presupposes non-synchronous, non-equivalent, uneven, and asymmetrical mutual relations. Diffuse reciprocity enables smooth cooperation, but, at the same time, is limited in a sense that it is unable to enforce an implementation of the agreement as promised. Specific reciprocity presupposes synchronous, equivalent, and symmetrical relations. Specific reciprocity also stresses the implementation of agreement through different stages. When we adopt specific reciprocity, an agreement, once it is reached, is highly likely to be implemented.

The progressive government utilizes incentives in the name of sunshine or engagement. Engagement policy could be compared to an Aesop fable, where sunshine is more effective in making a man take off

1 Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization* 40, no. 1 (Winter, 1986): 1-27.

his coat than the wind. The engagement policy presupposes that pressure can only contribute to solidifying the North Korean regime and that engagement is more effective in inducing North Korea's change without provoking it.

The progressive government applies diffuse reciprocity to inter-Korean relations. A diffuse reciprocity can be summed up as 'giving many, taking less, giving what North Korea wants, and taking what North Korea can offer.'

On the other hand, the conservative government prefers specific reciprocity. It argues that diffuse reciprocity causes North Korea's recalcitrant attitudes and breach of promises. Specific reciprocity dictates that North Korea should express gratitude for assistance, give something corresponding in return, and prove a change in policy.

Sixth is the approach and tools used for policy. The progressive government puts weight on engagement policy under which an engagement induces North Korea to respond and change its policy. In contrast, the conservative government prioritizes pressure policy under which pressure compels North Korea to change.

In the meantime, policy tools for North Korea include pressure tools (diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and military demonstrations) and incentive tools (economic incentives, security guarantee, recognition of the regime, and the establishment of diplomatic relations).

However, the conservative government stresses pressure tools under the assumption that the engagement policy has a limit in how much it could induce North Korea to open, reform and change its South Korea policy. The conservative government believes that a stick is much more effective than a carrot to make North Korea change.

The seventh criteria is the priority setting between inter-Korean cooperation and international cooperation. Progressive governments emphasize allowing South and North Korea to take the initiative even though they recognize the importance of international cooperation. In this manner, they seek to find a breakthrough in international cooperation

through inter-Korean cooperation while seeking a balance between international and inter-Korean cooperation.

By contrast, conservative governments highlight international cooperation, and in particular, the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance, ROK-Japan cooperation, and cooperation with the UN.²

〈Table 1〉 A Comparison of North Korea Policies under the Progressive Governments and Conservative Governments after Democratization

	Progressive Governments	Conservative Governments
Goals of North Korea Policy	Managing division, peaceful coexistence, and de facto unification	Legislative and institutional unification, and unification preparation
Perceptions of North Korea	Acknowledging the North Korean system viewing North Korea as a subject for support and cooperation partner	Not acknowledging the North Korean system, viewing North Korea with vigilance and hostility
Characterization of Unification and North Korea Issues	Emphasizing the particularity	Emphasizing the universality
Priority of Nuclear Issues (Whether Political and Economic Efforts are in Sync)	Resolving nuclear issues and promoting inter-Korean cooperation at the same time or separating the two (separation of politics and economy)	Primarily resolving North Korea's nuclear issues (politics in sync with economy)
Characterization of the Principle of Reciprocity	Loose form of the principle of reciprocity	Rigid form of the principle of reciprocity
Approach and Policy Tools	Emphasizing engagement policy, incentives (economic incentives, security guarantee, acknowledgment of the system, establishment of diplomatic relations)	Emphasizing pressure policy, pressure tools (diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, military demonstrations, etc.)
Preference between Inter-Korean Cooperation and International Cooperation	Prioritizing inter-Korean cooperation	Prioritizing international cooperation

2 Kyu-Chang Lee, Jong-Chul Park et al., *Sustainable Unification and North Korea Policy: Analysis of Environment and Implementation Direction* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2017), 7-12. (in Korean)

III. Prospects of North Korea Policy under the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration

The People's Power Party (hereinafter referred to as "PPP") promised to normalize inter-Korean relations, prioritize national interests in foreign affairs, and strengthen security and national defense in its Electoral Pledges during the 20th presidential elections campaign.³ These pledges were fleshed out into the visible North Korea, foreign, and security policies of the Yoon Suk-yeol government after having gone through the review by the Presidential Transition Committee. How those policies take shape will be determined by how the new ROK government will lay out the policy direction and come up with measures in respond to North Korea's upcoming policy or possible contingencies.

(1) Normalization of Inter-Korean Relations

First, the new ROK government has set complete denuclearization as a goal. Detailed sub-goals include the following: reaching a peace agreement once a complete, verifiable denuclearization is achieved; seeking a denuclearization negotiation with the principle and coherency in place (presenting a roadmap for denuclearization, upholding the principle of reciprocity, maintaining sanctions against North Korea until a complete denuclearization is achieved, and making economic assistance possible contingent upon the actual implementation of denuclearization measures); promoting international coordination for denuclearization; and making a permanent three-way dialogue channel by establishing the US-ROK-DPRK liaison office in Panmunjom (Washington). This line of policy is a result of reflection of the conservative perspectives as a complete denuclearization has been set as a goal as opposed to nuclear freeze or phased resolution for North Korea's nuclear issue.

3 *Policy Pledges of the People's Power Party for the 20th Presidential Elections: New Republic of Korea Shaped by the Principle of Fairness and Common Sense* (Seoul: People's Power Party, 2022)

Third, it is notable that the new government vowed to facilitate a Green Détente (joint responses to fine dust, natural disasters, and climate change, and cooperation on forest, agriculture, and maritime resources) considering the severity of climate change and national disasters. The Green Detente had been implemented under the Lee Myung-bak government and the Park Geun-hye government and, under the Moon government, proceeded in a different name of 'Life and Safety Community of the Korean Peninsula.' The Yoon Suk-yeol government restored the name of Green Détente, recognizing the importance of ecological crisis.

Second, normalization of inter-Korean relations and co-prosperity have been defined as the follow-up tasks after denuclearization is achieved. It indicates that economic cooperation and a 'development plan for inter-Korean economy' will be promoted in line with the progress of denuclearization.

What is also noteworthy is that the government pledged to provide humanitarian aid, resolve humanitarian issues (resolving issues of prisoners of war, abductees in North Korea, and separated family, and providing protection and assistance to North Korean defectors) even before denuclearization. The ROK government asserts that it will resolve humanitarian issues with a sense of consistency in place without having it tied to denuclearization, as humanitarian issues are a separate issue from sanctions imposed against North Korea. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration also pledged to underscore humanitarian issues, establish the North Korean Human Rights Foundation and reform the institutions to aid North Korean defectors settling in South Korean society.

(2) National Interests—first Diplomacy

Second, the ROK plans to advance ROK-China relations on mutually respective terms through presidential visits, establishing a hotline between high-ranking officials, setting up dialogue channels, and fostering cooperation on multiple fronts including the economy, public health, climate change, fine dust, and cultural exchanges. Detailed measures on

how to coordinate the US-ROK alliance and the ROK-China cooperation have not been revealed.

First, the new ROK government prioritizes the strengthening of the US-ROK 'comprehensive strategic alliance.' With this focus in mind, the government presented the tasks of enhancing the US-ROK deterrence capability and comprehensive strategic alliance (increasing role in the global arena, sharing a future vision of the Asia Pacific region and global order), and promoting cooperation in new frontiers (new technology, global supply chain, space, cyber space, and reactors). The ROK government also set out to participate in QUAD-affiliated working groups in areas such as vaccines, climate change, and new technology to promote cooperation in the East Asian region and seek an official membership later. It can be viewed along the lines of the comprehensive strategic partnership reached between the ROK and the US on the US-ROK summit on May 21, 2021.

Fourth, the ROK government seeks to focus on economy and security to brace for the possible global economic crisis and emerging security threats, establishing the Office of Emerging Security Challenges (ESC), promoting global contribution diplomacy, and improving the ability to counter cyber security threats.

Third, in terms of the ROK-Japan relations, the government pledged to realize a '2.0 Era of Kim Dae-jung-Keizō Obuchi Declaration,' uphold an independent and confident attitude on issues related to sovereignty and unresolved issues involving past atrocities of imperialist Japan while expanding exchanges with the future generations between South Korea and Japan. The ROK government also promised to expand ROK-Russia cooperation and establish a global cooperative network tailored to different regions (promoting ROK-ASEAN cooperation and cooperation with India, Oceania, and Europe).

(3) Robust Security and National Defense

First, pressing priorities are reinforcing the US-ROK military alliance and countering North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Detailed measures

to accomplish tasks include operationalizing the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), deploying a strategic assets, and reconstructing the ROK-US combined defense posture.

In sum, the Yoon Suk-yeol government's North Korea policy can be summarized as follows: the principle of denuclearization-first, resolving humanitarian issues, strengthening the US-ROK alliance, and boosting military deterrence. This is distinctly different from the policy implemented under the Moon Jae-in government, and can be largely viewed as an extension of the paradigm of the conservative governments of the past.

Second, the ROK government also focuses on restoring a three-axis system (Kill Chain, KAMD, and KMPR) in response to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. In addition, the government sets out to deploy "South Korea's new 'Iron Dome'-style system" earlier than scheduled by 2026, and an independent micro-satellite-based reconnaissance system.

IV. Challenges

(1) Duality of North Korea's Threats

Even with voluminous studies on North Korea, North Korea remains a hermit kingdom that is incomprehensible, perplexing and unpredictable. It is perceived as an object for animosity and threats and at the same time a partner for cooperation. The country has both system-stabilizing factors and system-destabilizing factors.

North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles have made damaging reverberations on the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian order. North Korea, by advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities, attempts to outpower South Korea and take the initiative in the affairs of inter-Korean relations and unification. It affords a sense of anxiety and confusion when we ponder to what extent North Korea would advance its nuclear capabilities, which are still an ongoing process, how inter-Korean relations would unfold, and what kinds of unification would come about

in the process. Phased resolutions for denuclearization have been tried in the past through the Agreed Framework, the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005, and the Joint Statement between the US and the DPRK at the Singapore Summit, but only to find ourselves confronted with North Korea's advanced nuclear arsenal.

Another thorny issue in North Korea is whether its regime has been stabilized. It is clear that the Kim Jong-un regime is plagued by factors that may precipitate the fracture of it, such as an expansion of the market, a gap between regions and between classes, the ethos of individualism and mammonism, and economic hardships triggered by the triple whammy (sanctions, floods, and the coronavirus pandemic). However, it is still true that the power structure of the Kim Jong-un regime, despite all the debilitating factors, has increasingly been solidified and stabilized over time. The regime also exhibits stabilizing elements, such as a state control on the market, functioning social control mechanisms, and the lack of potential for collective resistance. The argument for the collapse of North Korea is thus not compelling. However, it is important to continuously observe how those debilitating factors would play out in North Korea. It is a daunting task to manage inter-Korean relations and pursue unification with North Korea, which is ambivalent in nature.

(2) Dilemma in the Strengthening of Deterrence and Arms Race

The question of whether possessing nuclear weapons when facing hostile states will strike a strategic balance via the balance of terror or trigger conventional arms races and military conflicts is a theoretical and realistic issue. The US and the Soviet Union averted full-blown armed conflicts under the balance of horror during the Cold War. However, regional skirmishes occurred in many places, which launched attacks on the weak points of their respective opponents. The Cuban missile crisis, a civil war in Angola, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union originated from the attempts by the US and the Soviets to test out the intentions and strategies of their opponent.

India and Pakistan are de facto nuclear weapons states, although they have not been officially recognized as such. The two countries, after having reached a balance through nuclear weapons, are engaged in a conventional weapons arms race and locked in a repeated cycle of armed conflicts, ceasefire, and reconciliation. This can be viewed as an example of the 'stability-instability paradox' which dictates that although nuclear weapons provide deterrence to prevent an all-out war, they are paradoxically prone to low level confrontations and armed conflicts.⁴

It is fair to say that North Korea has developed its nuclear arsenal to make up for a lack of conventional military force vis-a-vis the US-ROK joint military force. North Korea appeared to have a plan to reverse the situation of being an underdog in terms of military force by possessing nuclear weapons and investing the budget reserved for the military in the economic sector. However, North Korea's nuclear weapons have become counter-balanced by the US's nuclear umbrella. As a result, North Korea has expanded the investment in developing missiles and the state-of-the-art missile technology.

As such, a double arms race is occurring, with the US's nuclear umbrella against North Korea's nuclear threats on one side and an inter-Korean arms race with the conventional and high-tech weaponry on the other side. We are witnessing a dilemma where negotiations are pursued with a goal of North Korea's denuclearization on one hand, and an ongoing arms race in conventional weapons on the other hand.

South Korea, relying on the US's nuclear umbrella, has continued to expand investing in conventional military force, such as developing missiles, building a missile defense system, and strengthening the naval and air force. Terminating the Missile Guideline between the ROK and the US in 2021 eliminated an obstacle facing South Korea's missile development.

⁴ Geunwook Lee, "Provocation and Competition after Nuclear Armament: Understanding India-Pakistan Conflicts," *Strategic Studies*, no. 80 (March 2020): 227-248. (in Korean)

In the meantime, the arms race in East Asia, involving the US-China strategic competitions, Japan's development of attack weapons against enemy bases, and Taiwan's military build-up, is unfolding amidst the arms race on the Korean Peninsula.

(3) New Cold War Trends

The division, confrontation, and inter-Korean dialogues on the Korean Peninsula all fell under the influence of the international political landscape as the division of the Korean Peninsula and the Korean War were a byproduct of the Cold War. Inter-Korean dialogues in the 1970s had been made possible by the detente. Global shifts in the post-Cold War era facilitated inter-Korean dialogues, which culminated in a few summit meetings and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. This had been driven by a combination of international shifts in the wake of the post-Cold War, South Korea having secured an initiative, and North Korea being put into a disadvantageous position.

New trends in the new Cold War are posing new challenges to the Korean Peninsula. In fact, from the Trump to the Biden administrations, US and China have been engaged in strategic competition over the hegemony, military conflicts, and geo-economics.⁵ The US-China strategic competition exhibits patterns similar to the Cold War era, as it is manifested to be conflicts over values, all-out confrontations, and confrontations between the ideological camps of democracy (QUAD, Europe, South Korea, and other US allies and partners) vs. authoritarianism (China, Russia, and North Korea), confronting each other in almost all sectors, such as the military, economy, science, and technology. The war in Ukraine is evolving into new conflicts, such as a confrontation between the US and Russia, with China taking sides with Russia.

5 Jongho Shin et al., *What Options can South Korea Choose in the U.S.-China Strategic Competition? Historical Case Studies* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2021), 61-70. (in Korean)

It is evident that these new Cold War trends will significantly impact the world order, East Asian order, and the future of the Korean Peninsula. The Biden administration mentioned that the US may cooperate with China on certain issues, including North Korea's nuclear issue, climate change, and response to COVID-19, only to find itself facing the cold shoulder of China.

North Korea sought to find a way forward through summit meetings with the US in 2018. At the same time, the North strove to restore bilateral relations through summit meetings with China before and after the US-DPRK summit and improve relations with Russia. After the breakdown of the Hanoi summit in 2019, North Korea's focus had shifted to the doctrine of self-reliance (*Charkyok Kaengsaeng*) and the strengthening of defense power instead of being hell-bent on a dialogue with the US, while cozying up with Russia and China.

China and Russia's opposition to the UN resolution in response to North Korea's consecutive missile launches at the beginning of 2022 was a precursor to the future where the new Cold War would affect the Korean Peninsula. New Cold War trends, a combination of the US-China strategic competition and the US-Russia confrontation, are highly likely to hinder the improvement of inter-Korean dialogues and relations.

(4) Global Ecological Crisis

Humanity can no longer remain indifferent to global ecological crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic reminds us of the threats of new infectious diseases and is expected to mark a complete different scene in international relations and individual life. Global-scale climate change and natural disasters are posing a threat to humanity, which is a sobering reminder that the Earth is a living organism. A global ecological crisis, involving the pandemic, climate change, and natural disasters, is threatening the ecology of humanity and will bring enormous changes to the world order, economic structure, and people's way of life.⁶

It is evident that South and North Korea are not immune to global

ecological crisis. The spread of forest pestilences, flooding, and the spread of African swine fever are telling examples of the impact of the global ecological crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The global ecological crisis facing the two Koreas poses a grave threat that goes beyond nuclear and missile threats and conventional military threats. It is pressing for South and North Korea to put aside arms competition and political confrontation and find a joint response to global ecological threats.

(5) Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Hindered by Sanctions

Although the economic effects of the UN and the US's sanctions imposed against North Korea, designed to be seamlessly penetrable in a wide range of sectors, have been proven to some extent, sanctions have yet to reach a target—North Korea's nuclear abandonment.⁷ What is clear is that sanctions are a card that the international community can play in response to North Korea's nuclear and missile advancement. In fact, North Korea's nuclear and missile advancement collide with sanctions. North Korea's sanctions have completely upended the patterns of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. It is realistically not feasible for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation to avert the sanctions. Under the UN sanctions and the US's 'North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016,' inter-Korean economic cooperation and exchange (trade, consigned processing, and direct investment) violate the provisions of sanctions (a ban on joint ventures, investment, exports of delivery vehicles, import and exports of goods, and bulk cash). The tour to Mt. Geumgang and Gaesong Industrial Complex projects were suspended by unilateral decision of the

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- 6 Bum-sik Shin et al., *Book Series No. 43 of the Center for International Studies in Seoul National University: Climate Change and Social Transformation* (Seoul: Sahoipyounghon Academy, April 2022); Sang-bae Kim (ed.), *Book Series No. 44 of the Center for International Studies in Seoul National University: COVID-19 and International Politics of Newly Emerging Security* (Seoul: Sahoipyounghon Academy, April 2022)
 - 7 Suhoo Lim, "Mid to Long-term Effects of Economic Sanctions Imposed on North Korea: Political and Economic Projection for the Future of the North Korean Economy," *INSS Research Paper*, no. 2019-17 (2019), 8-120. (in Korean)

ROK government even before the UN sanctions went into effect in 2016. The resumption of those projects also infringe the sanctions' provisions.⁸

Although the Moon Jae-in government sought to promote individual tourism, humanitarian cooperation, and provision of vaccines, which are not subject to sanctions, it was to no avail due to North Korea's reluctance and its border shutdown. Inter-Korean economic cooperation is impossible unless nuclear issues find a breakthrough and sanctions are alleviated.

The Yoon Suk-yeol government holds the denuclearization-first principle, which dictates that a complete resolution for the nuclear issue should come first and that inter-Korean cooperation would not proceed without progress on the nuclear front. Despite this principle, exploring areas such as humanitarian cooperation and a response to global ecological crisis is still necessary to promote human security, maintain the ecosystem on the Korean Peninsula, and guarantee the rights to life for South and North Koreans.

(6) Deep-rooted Chasms of South-South Conflicts

The North Korea policy of the ROK government has repeatedly swung like a pendulum, moving between both ends of the ideological spectrum against the backdrop of shifting governments in post-democratization, North Korea's evolving nuclear issues and national strategy, and the change of the US government. North Korea policy of the South Korean government, had moved from the pressure policy to the engagement policy, and has gone through trials and errors, which in turn offers the lessons learned from the past. The pressure policy and engagement policy share common components such as limited policy leverage toward North Korea and the international community and difficulties in building public consensus. Yet, still, the ideological fight and rhetoric are recurring instead

8 Suhoo Lim, "Considerations for Enacting Policy on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation for the New ROK Government," *INSS Strategic Report*, no. 157 (February 2022), 6-14. (in Korean)

of exploring a new paradigm.

Numerous factors are at play in this repetition of ideological rhetoric. The progressive and conservative camps have conflicting stances in terms of the goal, tools, priority, and procedures of North Korea policy, which causes the discontinuity of North Korea policy. The confrontation of the ideological logic is reproduced by South-South conflicts which are manifested as a complex and mixed form of regional, ideological, and generational conflicts in South Korea.⁹ The latter are recently emerging as a salient issue as the new generation has a more individual, universal, practical approach to attaining a goal while viewing the process of unification from the perspective of multi-culture compared to the older generations. It is not that the new generation is indifferent to unification but that it approaches unification differently from the older generation's nationalist and statist approach.¹⁰

The South-South conflict has been expanded by group-focused political culture, politicization of civil groups, and digital biases caused by the spread of online communications. In particular, the political domain actively capitalizes on the South-South conflict and sometimes mobilizes it, thereby expanding and reproducing the South-South conflict.¹¹

Chasms in the South-South conflict are also linked to the power structure of the single presidential term of five years. Whichever government takes power under the five-year single presidential term, it spends time and energy on self-justification for North Korea policy, wishful thinking, self-fulfilling prophecy, and trying to differentiate itself from the previous government. And yet, every government's North Korea

9 Jong-Chul Park, "South-South Conflicts and the Landscape of Unification Discourse," in *Unification Disputes: 12 Points of Controversy, New Exploration*, ed. Soonsung Park (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2015), 59-66. (in Korean)

10 Jong-Chul Park et al., *Survey on North and South Korean People's Perception of the Identity of a Unified State* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2016). (in Korean)

11 Juhwa Park et al., *Near-future Strategies and Major Tasks for Public Consensus on Peace in Korea* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2021), 105-124. (in Korean)

policy falls into the trap of self-justification and rigidity despite rapid changes of North Korea's internal situation and the international situation. This begets a repeated vicious cycle of the discontinued North Korea policy by a change of the government and the prolonged South-South conflicts.

V. A New Paradigm of North Korea Policy

(1) Setting a Milestone of Peaceful Coexistence and Unification

The peace and unification discourse is discussed dichotomously although the two are likened to the two sides of the same coin. The peaceful coexistence policy focuses on managing the division, facilitating the reconciliation and cooperation, and creating an environment for unification. However, this kind of policy that lacks a mid-to long-term vision for unification, ideal vision for the future, and unification strategy, is censured as the status-quo-policy. On the other hand, the unification-focused policy is prone to omitting the process of peaceful cooperation and unification and is likely to focus on the end-state unification, which makes realizing unification highly unlikely.

Therefore, a comprehensive initiative is necessary to link unification-preparation policy and peaceful coexistence policy: the former will help prepare for unification with a unification vision and strategy; and the latter facilitates cooperation and peaceful coexistence and creates an environment ripe for unification. In other words, North Korea policy and unification policy should be seamlessly linked with each other. The unification policy is said to provide a detailed guideline to North Korea policy while North Korea policy is perceived to be a roadmap to the end-state of unification, made possible by policy implementation.

Given the military and political confrontation between the two Koreas, the short-term and mid-term tasks include stably managing the divided state and settling peace. It is vital to continuously foster inter-Korean integration and legislative and institutional integration for unification

within a framework of unification roadmap so that a peaceful coexistence policy would not lead to permanent division.

(2) Pursuing Sustainable North Korea Policy

Implementing a sustainable North Korea policy is challenging amidst the conflicting paradigm between the progressive and conservative. The post-democratization reality in South Korea tells us that every government finds it hard to earn a majority of the vote. Once the government is in power by earning anything short of a majority of the vote, it finds itself being confronted by the opposition force of the majority and a cut-throat competition over the next presidential elections behind the scene. All of it begins concurrently as the new incoming president takes the oath of the office. It is an all too familiar scene that the president—who tries to govern the country allied with the ruling party and the opposition party are in a tug-of-war over who takes the initiative. What is also familiar is that the political power struggle, connected to a polarized civil society, transpires into extreme confrontation outside the institution. In particular, one of the thorny issues is how to implement a sustainable North Korea policy that could earn the majority support amidst contrasting views between the progressive and the conservative.

What constitutes the sustainable policy then? First, the criteria for sustainability is adaptability. Sustainability requires a continuity that could withstand the changes of time and circumstances. The policy should be detached from rigidity and be flexible, and evolve by adapting to changes in the environment. The adaptation is divided into institutional adaptation and functional adaptation. Institutional adaptation refers to improving the adaptability by revising, withdrawing, and newly creating the institutions and organizations. Functional adaptation refers to the functional transition of the same institutions and organizations in accordance with environmental changes.

A sustainable North Korea policy should have be flexible and adaptable, doing away with dogma, rigidity, and self-rationalization.

A sustainable policy should have elasticity and a self-coordination ability that could flexibly adapt to a rapidly changing international situation, North Korean situations, and domestic circumstances.

Second, a sustainable policy should go for institutionalization which refers to the status of stabilizing norms, principle, and procedures, and their routinization. Acts, norms, and procedures should be governed and stabilized by institutionalization, which can ensure institutional adaptability and functional adaptability that could respond to changes in the environment.

The institutionalization of North Korea policy includes the following three components. First, it should contain stability reinforced by a repetition of a policy decision-making system and networks. Institutionalization of a policy decision-making system and networks will ensure operational capability that could embrace and implement policy changes regardless of domestic and international changes and a change in government. Next, institutionalization of North Korea policy aims for the institutionalization of inter-Korean dialogues which can be pursued by a bottom-up approach through working-level meetings and a top-down approach via high-level summits, including summit meetings. In addition, institutionalization guaranteed by the compliance of inter-Korean agreements and accumulation of exchange and cooperation will help make inter-Korean relations resilient and durable in the face of the changing environment.

Third, a sustainable policy should be efficacious. This efficacy can only be fulfilled when a feasible policy is implemented based on an accurate assessment of the situation and of capabilities, doing away with empty discourse or idealistic arguments. An efficacious North Korea policy should be multi-dimensional and multi-layered considering the complex nature of unification issues. Priority should be set with the consideration for policy environment and abilities. For example, a three-dimensional framework is required that will enable exploring the limited autonomy for humanitarian issues and exchange and cooperation even if the dominance of nuclear and missile issues is acknowledged.

Fourth, a sustainable policy requires consensus building. Consensus building does not mean the assimilation toward one side or the predominance of one side. The starting point of consensus building is to recognize that coordination, management, and transition of conflict are necessary as conflict is, by nature, hard to resolve. Consensus building can be possible when one recognizes the difference of other's opinions, explores coexistence, and tries to come to, at least, a middle ground for agreement.

A sustainable North Korea policy is made possible only when a minimum agreement between the conservative and the progressive is reached and a minimum level of political and social agreements is achieved based on the foundation of recognizing the diversity of public opinion. It should be acknowledged that when it comes to North Korea policy, it is impossible for one side to persuade the other side or to win a complete victory. Both sides should find a minimum point of agreement and try to coexist with the other under the recognition that South-South conflicts do exist.¹²

(3) Convergent Engagement Policy

Both engagement policy and pressure policy are based on different theoretical assumptions and policy. However, neither the engagement policy nor pressure policy of past ROK governments had achieved the goals of denuclearization, peace-settlement, or institutionalization of exchange and cooperation with North Korea. Hence, a strategic and selective converging of two approaches is needed that goes beyond the dichotomy of engagement policy and pressure policy.

First, convergent engagement refers to selective engagement that selectively combines engagement and pressure over various issues depending

12 Kyu-Chang Lee, Jong-Chul Park et al., *Sustainable Unification and North Korea Policy: Analysis of Environment and Implementation Direction* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2017), 41-44. (in Korean)

on the conditions and circumstances. The effects of a pressure-only policy or engagement-only policy are limited. Selective engagement overcomes the limits of rewards-oriented or sanctions-focused North Korea policy. The selective engagement policy adjusts the level and the range of cooperation depending on North Korea's policy changes and the progress of negotiations. Selective engagement stably manages inter-Korean relations and induces changes from North Korea while avoiding the controversy of 'pork barrel policy.'

Second, convergent engagement is a strategic combination of relational engagement and structural engagement. Relational engagement establishes relations where entities exchange short-term trade-offs and thus induces changes in policy and behavior of the other party. However, once the exchange of interests is suspended, cooperation comes to a halt, reversing back to the pre-cooperation status. Structural engagement is a long-term policy that aims for changes in values, norms, and identity, and creates irreversible and fundamental changes. However, if the counterpart perceives this fundamental change to be a threat, the other party will become intransigent, making structural changes highly unlikely.¹³

The progressive governments have tested out their engagement policy with unclear goals within the spectrum of relational engagement and structural engagement. North Korea is skeptical of the progressive government's policy in that the North perceives relational changes to be an extension of structural changes targeting North Korea. In the same vein, the pressure policy of the conservative governments, too, was unable to bring changes to ROK's relations with North Korea or induce structural changes in the North Korean regime. Therefore, convergent engagement should be comprehensive in a sense that applies relational and structural engagement from a strategic perspective.

Third, convergent engagement flexibly combines the tools for pressure and engagement depending on the situation and the phases. It

13 Jaesung Jeon, "International Political Theory of Engagement Policy and South Korea's North Korea Policy," *The Korean Journal of International Relations* 43, no. 1 (2003): 231-250. (in Korean)

is crucial to maintain an international network for sanctions on the regime, while sternly responding to North Korea's provocations. However, it should be made clear that North Korea's friendly attitudes and cooperation are met by rewards. The types and the size of rewards should be adjusted depending on the issues at hand.

Fourth, convergent engagement is the strategic application of diffuse reciprocity and specific reciprocity. Given the multi-layered and complex nature of inter-Korean relations, it is hard to apply specific reciprocity in the short-term. If specific reciprocity is applied, inter-Korean relations will not progress due to North Korea's intransigent and exclusive nature. A realistic option is to apply diffuse reciprocity at the early phase of inter-Korean relations—a phase that enables finding a clue to tangled relations. Once inter-Korean cooperation develops further, more specific reciprocity can be applied. One should have a keen eye to selectively apply reciprocity depending on the issue as well as North Korea's response instead of adhering to the principle of reciprocity.

(4) Three-dimensional Arms Control

The arms race between the two Koreas is unfolding in the following three ways. First is about North Korea's nuclear threats and South Korea's deterrent ability. A tug-of-war will continue until a balance of terror is achieved between North Korea's nuclear advancement and the US's nuclear deterrence. Second is about missiles, missile defense system, and the arms race with state-of-the-art weaponry. South and North Korea will continue to accelerate their arms race in those areas. Third is cyber security. Competition will become fiercer in the cyber defense sector where South and North Korea flex their muscles with spears and shields.

Three-dimensional arms control measures should be devised to stem the inter-Korean arms race. First, Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee should be convened to have a consultation on how to implement the follow-up measures of 'Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain' (The 2018 Military

Agreement). 'The 2018 Military Agreement' specifies measures to selectively fuse military confidence-building, operational arms control, and structural arms control as opposed to phased arms control in Europe.¹⁴ It is crucial to restore the 'the 2018 Military Agreement' and devise implementation measures of an arms control model for the Korean Peninsula.

Second, arms control should be enforced on conventional military force. Inter-Korean arms control has challenging tasks involving an assessment of the symmetry of military force, setting a criteria for the proportion and the size of the military force, and the selection for the targets for arms reduction.¹⁵ An inter-Korean summit meeting and inter-Korean ministerial meeting should be preceded by arms control between the two Koreas. Inter-Korean arms control also necessitates changes in the larger frameworks, such as making a breakthrough in the nuclear negotiation and improving DPRK-US relations.

Third, an arms control model should be devised that comprehensively factors in nuclear and missile issues as North Korea's nuclear capability advances in tandem with its missile capabilities. In the past, missile meetings proceeded together with nuclear negotiations between the DPRK and the US. The US-DPRK missile meetings were held six times (1996-2000). As a result, the US-DPRK Joint Communiqué (2000.10) on the suspension of missile development had been adopted.

It is necessary to consider holding a four-party meeting (South, North Korea, the US, and China) to deal with nuclear and missile issues. It is worthwhile to hold a four-party talk, including China, given the influence of China in the Korean Peninsula and East Asia. The four-party talks can

14 Jong-Chul Park, "Characteristics of the Korean Peninsula Arms Control Model and Its Gradual Implementation," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 33, no. 2 (Autumn/Winter 2020): 107-128.

15 Cheol-wun Jang et al., *The Arms Race and the Establishment of Peace on the Korean Peninsula* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2021), 229-256. (in Korean)

provide measures to guarantee the implementation of the agreements. The four-party talks can be divided into a general meeting and sub-division meeting so that nuclear and missile issues can be negotiated in parallel. For instance, the general meeting of the four-party talks can discuss the timeline and decisions of the sub-division committee. The nuclear sub-division committee and the missile sub-division committee can work on the negotiations of the topic assigned to it.

(5) Core Agenda in Inter-Korean Cooperation: Humanitarian Cooperation and Green Detente

Since the emergence of North Korea's nuclear issues in the 1990s, inter-Korean relations have gone through ups and downs depending on how North Korea's nuclear issues have unfolded. In retrospect, the heyday of the inter-Korean cooperation in early 2000s had been made possible since nuclear issues were bridled by the Agreed Framework and the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005. Once nuclear issues deteriorated, inter-Korean relations were always halted or faced a stalemate. Moreover, inter-Korean exchange and cooperation cannot take one step further under the sanctions regime of the UN and the US.

With no short-term resolution of nuclear issues and the lifting of sanctions in sight, a new agenda is needed for inter-Korean cooperation. That new agenda should be set and implemented to allow inter-Korean exchange and cooperation to go beyond the existing route of tourism, trade, consigned manufacturing, consigned processing, and construction of the industrial complex.

First, a focus should be on humanitarian cooperation that is possible and legitimate under the sanctions and that is needed for North Korea. On top of the food assistance, it is desirable to explore how to cooperate on agricultural technology, which is emphasized by North Korea. Instead of being obsessed with bilateral cooperation, the two Koreas should desirably find a new path in inter-Korean cooperation through multilateral cooperation with China and the international organizations.

Second, cooperation in the health care sector should proceed, starting with the vaccine provision. A comprehensive pandemic-preventive medical system should be established and more encompassing health care cooperative measures should be devised.

Third, the Green Détente should evolve into a new area of inter-Korean cooperation. The Green Détente, a combination of "Green" and "Détente," refers to building trust and establishing a cooperative system through green cooperation.¹⁶ South and North Korea should jointly respond to and seek cooperation on environmental issues, climate, and natural disaster, thereby easing confrontation and tensions on the Korean Peninsula and implementing a policy to foster peace and co-prosperity.

South and North Korea should identify specific items in need of cooperation in areas, such as forests, joint management of water resources, and environment, as agreed upon in the existing inter-Korean agreements. The two should pursue transitioning energy for carbon neutrality, conserving water resources, and protecting the environment. The two Koreas should also seek out measures for inter-Korean cooperation utilizing the SDGs framework. North Korea submitted a Voluntary National Review (VNR) report on the SDGs implementation of the UN in 2021, expressing its interests in the environment, medical sector, energy, and health care and signaling its intention to cooperate with UN organizations.¹⁷ Cooperation on marine fishery is also required, including investigations on changes of distribution of fishery resources caused by rising sea temperature, damage on fishery done by abnormal weather conditions, examinations on Cooperation on marine fishery is also required, including investigations on changes of distribution of fishery resources caused by rising sea temperature, damage on fishery done by abnormal weather conditions, examinations on the sea and internal water

16 Jae-han Kim, "Theoretical Reflection on the Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula and Green Détente," *The Korean Journal of Unification Affairs* 26, no. 1 (2014): 65-92. (in Korean)

17 Un-Chul Yang, "An Evaluation of North Korea's Voluntary National Review (VNR)," *Sejong Policy Brief*, no. 2021-18 (October 2021). (in Korean)

damaged by wastes, joint research, and cooperative projects.¹⁸

The ROK should strive to counter sanctions based on the fact that humanitarian cooperation, health care and medical cooperation, environmental cooperation, and marine and fishery cooperation are legitimate and necessary as they are an embodiment of humanitarian and ecological conservation causes.

(6) Consensus and Cooperative Governance

Both the progressive and conservative governments have not succeeded in building public consensus despite their efforts to do so, as the ROK governments of the past have failed to move beyond their own ideological framework. Each government invited only like-minded people to various networks and forums, reproducing and reinforcing their own logic. Each has lessened what otherwise could have been a diverse venue for discourse by excluding people from the other ideological spectrum. As a result, the two side could not reach even a minimum level of common set of rules or principles.

The era of the Roh Tae-woo government is an exemplary model of governance when it comes to North Korea policy. The Roh government pursued governance and coordination on North Korea policy out of necessity as the administration faced a majority opposition party and thus needed to stabilize the situation of the Korean Peninsula leading up to the 1988 Seoul Olympics. Moreover, it had to take the initiative on unification issues, as the opposition party—who used to lead the democratization movement in South Korea—had the initiative on unification discourse. The Roh government established a 'Special Committee on North Korea Policy' at the National Assembly and held a public hearing on the issue of holding an inter-Korean joint conference at the National Assembly and inter-Korean meetings with students—a proposal put forward by North Korea. Other notable

18 In Joo Yoon, "UN Sustainable Development Goal No. 14: Marine Ecology and Development Cooperation with North Korea," *Ocean Policy Research* 35, no. 1 (Summer 2020): 153-178. (in Korean)

tasks included reaching the 1992 Basic Agreement (Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North) and adopting the Korean National Community Unification Formula.¹⁹

The Yoon Suk-yeol government needs to expand a venue for communication through governance based on consensus-building as it currently faces a hostile political environment: it won the presidential election by a narrow margin; the opposition party holds the majority; and there is a bifurcation of public opinion. Polarization, ideologicalization, and politicization of unification issues are expected to exacerbate under the current situation.

Against this backdrop, it is necessary to identify and test out the "condominium" or an area of joint governance for North Korea policy. The "condominium" sets unification issue as an area required of joint governance and institutionalizes the decision-making and discussion procedures for North Korea policy by bringing together various actors: the president, ruling and opposition parties, the National Assembly, and civil society. In the process, civil society can lead by building a consensus on North Korea policy and reach an agreement on the agreed-upon rules and policy direction.²⁰

First, it is necessary to strengthen consultations between the government and the National Assembly to reach a political and social consensus on North Korea policy. In West Germany, the Prime Minister of

19 Ji-yeon Shim, "National Assembly: An Arena of Public Debate of North Korea Policy," a paper presented at the International Conference on Establishing a Governance for Peace of the Korean Peninsula, organized by The Institute of Trans-division and Border Studies (ITBS) at Shinhan University, November 25, 2021. (in Korean)

20 Hyuk-baek Lim, "Historical Background of Formulating a Common Dominant Areas," a paper presented at the International Conference on Establishing a Governance for Peace of the Korean Peninsula, organized by The Institute of Trans-division and Border Studies (ITBS) at Shinhan University, November 25, 2021. (in Korean)

the Federal Chancellery held a breakfast meeting with the representative of the ruling party every Monday to foster cooperation between the government and political parties and had a luncheon with the representative of the coalition party. West Germany had also actively operated the consultative body between the government and the Congress at all times. Throughout this process, the Federal Chancellery of West Germany provided relevant information not only to coalition partners and the ruling party but also to the opposition party, calling for understanding and support. Considering the sensitivity inherent in diplomatic and national defense issues, West Germany adhered to the non-disclosure principle of not making public all the information and meeting minutes. Learning lessons from West Germany, it is important to create a permanent consultative body on unification issues between the government, ruling and opposition parties, and the National Assembly. The political sector should engage in cooperative politics where information on unification is shared between the government, the ruling party, and the opposition party, policy goes through consultations, and responsibility comes with obligations.

Second, it is vital to build social consensus on North Korea policy. Scholars of both sides of the ideological spectrum, politicians, and experts in West Germany agreed the Beutelsbacher Konsens that aims to foster coherent education that remains intact regardless of the change in government.²¹ Such a social consensus had made possible consistent German policy and Eastward policy that had withstood the changes in government. The progressives and conservatives in the ROK need to build at least minimum level of consensus and expand a common ground for North Korea policy based on such an agreement.

21 This educational guidance, established as a result of discussions between conservative and progressive political educators in West Germany in 1976, contains the following: 1) banning coercion (proscribing a coercive rehabilitative education or cramming education), 2) maintaining the controversial nature (setting a learning environment where real life controversies are actively debated), and 3) enhancing the ability for political acts (nurturing the practical skills that consider student's own political situation and interests).

Third, the governance structure between government and civil society should be created. North Korea policy cannot be implemented by the government alone but requires role-sharing and coordination between academia, expert groups, the media, and civil society. It is crucial to create a cooperative structure where the government shares information, resources, and policy networks with civil society and promotes coordination.²²

Fourth, a facilitator should come in to reach a social consensus. One way to do that is to take a lesson from the German case and establish the Civil Education Center for Democracy and Peace (tentatively named) as a civil organization. Building the Civil Education Center for Democracy and Peace that involves both the progressive and the conservative could help mitigate and accommodate ideological debates. It is necessary to create a regional Civil Education Center for Democracy and Peace and form a cooperative network.

VI. Conclusions

Challenges facing South Korea take complex forms, involving new and antiquated challenges and structural and circumstantial challenges. North Korean threats and arms races, albeit being an old challenge, are emerging as a more sinister force. South-South conflicts, despite being an antiquated challenge, have unfold in a much more complex form. New Cold War trends and global ecological crises may pose a new and structural challenge. Inter-Korean economic cooperation, confronted with obstacles (i.e., sanctions), should find a new path.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration was sworn in as the eighth ROK government since the country's democratization in 1987. North Korea policy moved from one end of the ideological spectrum to the other with

22 Kuk-shin Kim et al., *Improving and Facilitating the Governance of Peace and Prosperity of the Korean Peninsula* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2007). (in Korean)

the change in governments. North Korea policy has been locked in the framework of repeating the existing discourse even with the changes in international circumstances, the North Korean situation, and the domestic political landscape. Now is the time for North Korea policy to explore a new paradigm in the face of shifts in internal and external circumstances leaving behind the *déjà vu*.

What kinds of paradigm should North Korea policy pursue in the face of multi-layered challenges? The starting point is to objectively examine the achievements and limitations of the existing engagement policy and pressure policy. One cannot find a new path without exploring a new paradigm through objective analysis and verification of the past instances. Paradoxically, it is likely that the larger the shocks unleashed by internal and external challenges, the more the need for a new paradigm.

The new paradigm of North Korea policy pursues a sustainable policy that can adapt to environmental changes. A sustainable North Korea policy should facilitate a convergent engagement policy that strategically combines engagement and pressure. Furthermore, three-dimensional arms control, humanitarian cooperation, and the Green Détente should be promoted as part of the new plan. The new paradigm should embrace both the progressives and conservatives and be undergirded by consensus-building and governance that links the government, political parties, and civil society.

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